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Families Belong Together: The Path to Family 
Sanctity in Public Housing 
McKayla Stokes* 
ABSTRACT 
In its 2015 landmark civil rights decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court 
finally held that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States 
Constitution guarantee same-sex couples’ marital equality. The Court’s unprecedented 
declaration that the right to marry is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause 
strengthened married couples’ right to privacy because it subjects government actions 
infringing on marital unions to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has the option to 
minimize the impact of Obergefell by interpreting the right to marriage very narrowly—as 
only encompassing the right to enter into a state-recognized union with another person. 
However, drawling from Justice Douglas’ “penumbras principle” from Griswold v. 
Connecticut, this Note argues that interpreting the right to marriage to include its 
peripheral rights, like cohabitating, is the more principled approach. Using this approach, 
public housing authorities as government entities must prove that policies that disqualify 
ex-felons and arrestees from residing on their premises—even when their spouses are 
current residents—are necessary to further a compelling interest and narrowly tailored to 
be constitutional. Recognizing that a penumbra approach to interpreting the right to 
marriage would nonetheless leave non-marital families subject to broad governmental 
interference, this Note concludes by reasoning that non-marital families would have a 
strong argument that the differential treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause.  
INTRODUCTION 
“I have three children. I take care of a disabled uncle. I haven’t had any infractions 
since I was incarcerated. I’ve worked at one place for nine years,” explains Dana Monroe 
of Charlottesville whose nearly ten-year hunt for consistent housing has proved 
unsuccessful due to a single felony conviction.1 Ms. Monroe’s struggle to find housing is 
familiar among low-income ex-felons and arrestees. The sting of rejection that 
accompanies each rental denial ex-felons receive push some to give up applying 
altogether and submit to what seems inevitable—homelessness.2  
 
*J.D. Candidate Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2020; I am grateful to Erin F. Delaney and Destiny 
Peery whose critical feedback strengthened this Note immensely. I would like to thank the entire staff of 
Northwestern’s Journal of Law and Social Policy for their patience and suggestions during the editing 
process.  
1 Emily Hays, Barred from Affordable Housing, CHARLOTTESVILLE TOMORROW (May 13, 2018, 7:00 PM), 
https://www.cvilletomorrow.org/articles/barred-from-affordable-housing.   
2 See Amy Qin, Public Housing Appeals Give Hope to Homeless with Criminal Records, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE (Sep. 10, 2018, 6:15 AM), https://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2018/09/10/public-affordable-
housing-criminal-homeless-Pittsburgh-housing-authority/stories/201808190012.   
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During the 1980s, Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) began excluding applicants 
who had been arrested for, or criminally convicted of, a broad spectrum of crimes.3 The 
impact of public housing “bans” is diffuse because if one member of a family is 
ineligible, the remaining members eligible for residency must decide which is more 
tolerable: enduring indefinite periods of separation or committing to unaffordable private 
living arrangements. This dilemma is particularly alarming for families with young 
children or those with family members who suffer from a disability.4 While non-profit 
supportive housing entities provide relief to some,5 the critical question is not what can 
these entities do to help, but rather, why is their help needed in the first place?  
How is it permissible for government agencies to perpetuate homelessness and 
family separation on the grounds of a single member’s previous criminal history? One 
answer lies within the United States’ failure to strictly enforce constitutional rights and 
liberty interests to family sanctity and privacy. The text of the Constitution does not 
explicitly provide families with greater privacy rights, but several controversial Supreme 
Court decisions pieced together demonstrate that the Court recognizes the particular need 
for privacy in familial decisions.6 As a result, the Court has relied on the Due Process 
Clause to restrain government action that touches upon family matters. The disconnect, 
however, between the Constitution’s text and society’s special appreciation for families 
has resulted in extremely malleable “familial rights.” The unpredictable nature of the 
jurisprudence is partly due to the fact that substantive due process cases are inherently 
fact-specific and viewed with great skepticism by strict textualists and originalists.7    
 
3 See generally Lahny R. Silva, Criminal Histories in Public Housing, WIS. L. REV. 375 (2015).  
4 See Stories of Annapolis Residents Challenging Housing Policy that Tears Families Apart, AM. C.L. 
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/stories-annapolis-residents-challenging-housing-policy-tears-families-
apart (last visited Oct. 24, 2019). 
5 See Qin, supra note 2. 
6 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding for the first time that the due process clause 
“denotes not merely the freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to. . . marry, 
establish a home and bring up children. . .”); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & 
Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down the Compulsory Education Act of 1922 that forced 
parents to send their children to a public school in their residential district because “[u]nder the doctrine of 
Meyer v. Nebraska. . .the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 166 (1944) (citing both Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus & Mary as evidence that the “custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose 
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder” 
and “that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“reaffirm[ing] the principles of the Pierce and Meyer 
cases” in its decision that while the “association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution. . .  various 
guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy,” including the marriage relationship, that the state 
cannot unnecessarily invade); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499-504 (1977) 
(striking down a zoning ordinance that “narrowly defined family patterns” in a manner that prevented a 
grandmother from residing with her grandson on the grounds that the Court’s decisions “establish that the 
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family” which includes extended family households).     
7 Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 63, 79 (2006) (“[T]here is 
no persuasive evidence that these liberties were embraced by the original, objective public meaning of the 
clause. It seems plain that substantive due process grants constitutional protection to rights that are neither 
enumerated in the text nor grounded in the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the 
Court is protecting values that emerge from a process of nonoriginalist judicial decisionmaking. Needless 
to say, the identification and protection of unenumerated, nonoriginalist constitutional rights by the 
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This Note examines PHA policies that ban ex-felons and arrestees from residing 
with or visiting tenants in their complexes to illustrate that our current approach to 
protecting familial rights from governmental interference is insufficient in sensitive areas, 
like housing. It is helpful to view the problem through the lens of public housing bans for 
two reasons. First, discriminatory housing bans quite literally disrupt families. The lack 
of heightened judicial review despite the policies’ consequences demonstrates the 
vulnerability of familial rights. Second, recent Supreme Court decisions, stemming from 
Justice Kennedy’s landmark opinion Obergefell v. Hodges,8 known for securing marriage 
equality, makes attempts at bolstering familial rights most likely to succeed in the realm 
of housing. Now, married families in public housing have legitimate claims that housing 
bans infringe upon their marital union, which is constitutionally protected under 
Obergefell.9 If married families successfully leverage Obergefell, constitutionally-
mandated relief becomes contingent upon whether one attains a particular status—
marriage—and as such, relief is not still available to all families. This Note envisions a 
future where such an arbitrary differentiator traditionally utilized to treat nonmarital 
families as somehow “less than” will become the very vehicle to expanding the 
constitutional right to family sanctity for all families.  
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the organizational 
structure of public housing. It then details the pattern of racially-biased practices in the 
realm of public housing, ending with public housing bans and the consequences of family 
separation generally. It concludes by summarizing cases where the constitutionality of 
public housing bans is contested.  
Part II begins by demonstrating that while the Supreme Court has consistently 
afforded families heightened protection from government interference, families living in. 
public housing complexes remain vulnerable because the Supreme Court’s cases are not 
considered collectively. Then Part II contends that advocates may utilize Obergefell to 
expand the right to family sanctity by urging the Supreme Court to adopt a penumbra-
type approach to interpreting the scope of the right to marriage. Part II concludes with a 
description of the legal framework under the proposed penumbra-type approach.  
Part III hypothesizes that once advocates establish the right to marriages 
encompasses the right for spouses to cohabitate through Obergefell, they can then 
challenge public housing bans infringing upon non-marital families under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Part III concludes by analogizing the future of Obergefell to the legacy 
of Griswold and Eisenstadt.10  
 
unelected Supreme Court-with the Court nullifying legislative judgments on fundamental questions of 
political morality-is a highly controversial practice. As a result, it is hardly surprising that some have 
condemned the entire enterprise of substantive due process, calling it an unjustified judicial usurpation of 
political power and a flagrant violation of the basic principle of majoritarian self-government.”). 
8 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
9 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Obergefell, struck down same-sex marriage bans on the 
grounds that the fundamental right to marriage includes the right to marry a same-sex partner. See Mark 
Strasser, Obergefell, Dignity, and the Family, 19 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 317, 319 (2016). The 
declaration of marriage equality was not necessarily unanticipated, but Justice Kennedy’s approach in 
deriving the right surprised lawyers and scholars paying close attention. Id. at 317-18.  
10 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). 
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I. PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA 
In the United States, public housing “provide[s] affordable housing for the 
financially disadvantaged.”11 As of 2010, approximately two million residents lived in 
one of the 14,000 developments.12 The following section details the role of the federal 
and state governments in public housing, identifies policy initiatives that 
disproportionately impact communities of color, and reviews the constitutional tools 
available to public housing tenants challenging government action.  
A. Organizational Structure of Public Housing 
This Note focuses on public housing complexes that are federally-subsidized, state-
owned developments overseen by public housing authorities (PHAs).13 PHAs are created 
under state laws and are responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of public 
housing complexes.14 The federal government, through the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), provides PHAs with financial and professional 
assistance.15 HUD purports to grant PHAs the “maximum amount of responsibility and 
flexibility in program administration.”16 In practice, however, it is unclear whether PHAs 
are sufficiently detached from HUD.17 The responsiveness of PHAs to federal political 
pressure to target drug offenders in the 1980s suggests skepticism towards the notion that 
PHAs are independent from HUD.  
B. Racial Bias in Public Housing Policies 
A brief summary of the evolution of racist housing policies implemented by the 
government is helpful insofar as it provides support for viewing purportedly legitimate 
justifications for housing bans with great skepticism. 
During the conception of public housing in the early 1930s, the government 
constructed housing developments exclusively for Black people in underdeveloped areas 
of towns.18 The geographic placement of homes for Black people was partially limited 
because of legally enforced racially restrictive covenants and similar policies.19 During 
the 1950s, Federal Housing Authority (FHA) loans helped White families rapidly relocate 
into suburban neighborhoods20 because housing was cheaper and economic activities 
 
11 Jamie L. Wershbale, The Second Amendment under a Government Landlord: Is There a Right to Keep 
and Bear Legal Firearms in Public Housing?, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 995, 1000 (2010).  
12 Id. at 997–98. 
13 The focus is narrow, because in the litigation presupposed, tenants will need to demonstrate there is 
“government action” and cannot do so under other housing assistance programs, including vouchers.  
14 Wershbale, supra note 11, at 1000-01.  
15 See id. at 1001.  
16 Id. at 1000–01.  
17 See Martin D. Abravanel, Is Public Housing Ready for Freedom?, URBAN  INST. (Apr. 1, 2004), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/57301/1000631-Is-Public-Housing-Ready-For-
Freedom-.PDF.  
18 MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE LEGACY OF SEGREGATION 4 (2008).  
19 See generally John Kimble, Insuring Inequality: The Role of the Federal Housing Authority in the Urban 
Ghettoization of African Americans, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 399 (2009). Restrictive covenants are contracts 
that prohibit certain races from occupying a particular neighborhood. Id. at 411. 
20 See John M. Stahura, Suburban Development, Black Suburbanization and the Civil Rights Movement 
Since World War II, 51 AM. SOCIO. REV. 131, 132 (1986).  
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were also moving to the suburbs.21 The opportunities for Black families to take advantage 
of the benefits of suburbanization were limited because of discriminatory policies in the 
administration of FHA loans22 and exclusionary zoning ordinances, amongst other 
government policies.23 As a result, many Black families of all economic circumstances 
found themselves restricted to urban areas.24 
The federal government then launched its “urban renewal” program, justified by the 
increasing and entrenched urban poverty during the 1950s and 1960s.25 Urban renewal 
generally referred to policies authorizing state and local governments to eliminate urban 
blight.26 In reality, urban renewal meant “driving poor people out of their homes, i.e., 
black and minority removal, and building on the vacated premises luxury housing and 
commercial projects. . . profitable to speculators.”27 At the start of the urban renewal era, 
Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949, which called for the construction of 135,000 
public housing units per year for six years beginning in 1950.28 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
Congress ultimately only approved funding for between one-sixth and two-fifths of the 
promised 135,000 units each year.29 States and localities hoping to receive federal funds 
responded by drafting plans for buildings that maximized the number units built at the 
lowest cost point.30 Alas, the infamous “high-rise” housing projects were birthed.   
The high-rise projects were different than the designs proposed during the 1930s 
when the concept of public housing was first proposed as a vehicle to help White and 
Black families.31 These new high-rise projects may be characterized as “steel and 
concrete developments. . . surrounded by fields of extreme poverty” and for all effective 
purposes, were removed from mainstream society.32  
By the early 1980s, conditions in high-rise projects had deteriorated due to income-
based tenant selection policies, which resulted in a high number of unemployed tenants. 
To make matters worse, inadequate funding for security resulted in hazardous 
 
21 See id.  
22 Discriminatory policies included outright refusal to ensure mortgages as well as requiring developers to 
include clauses in deeds prohibiting resales to Black people in the future. See Richard Rothstein, Public 
Housing: Government-Sponsored Segregation, THE AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 11, 2012), 
https://prospect.org/article/public-housing-government-sponsored-segregation.  
23 Id. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).  
24 LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM 
PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA 20 (U. Chi. Press eds. 2000).  
25 TURNER, supra note 18, at 4.  
26 Richard Freeman, The 1949 Housing Act versus ‘Urban Renewal’, in 23 EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE REV. 
(EIR) 27, 28 (1996). 
27 Id. at 28–29.  
28 Id. at 28.  
29 Id.  
30 See D. Bradford Hunt, How Did Public Housing Survive the 1950s? 17 J. POL’Y HIST. 193, 210 (2005).   
31 See SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF A MODERN GHETTO 18 
(2000) (“The public housing project therefore continues to be laid out as a ‘community unit’ as large as 
possible and entirely divorced from its neighborhood surroundings, even though this only dramatizes the 
segregation of charity-case families. Standardization is emphasized rather than alleviated in project design, 
as a glorification of efficient productions methods and an expression of the goal of decent, safe and sanitary 
housing for all.”).  
32 Id.  
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conditions.33 During the “tough on crime” era, politicians eager for constituents’ support 
politicized and further dehumanized the Black and brown tenants in these state-created 
pockets of crime and isolation by making promises to (over)police public housing 
complexes.34 
C. History & Characteristics of Public Housing Bans 
In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act which required PHAs to evict 
tenants if they, any of their household members, or guests engaged in criminal activity on 
or near the complex.35 This was the first act that targeted public housing tenants 
exclusively, but many followed after President Bill Clinton’s 1996 State of the Union 
Address, when he declared: “If you break the law, you no longer have a home in public 
housing, one strike and you’re out. That should be the law everywhere in America.”36 In 
April 1996, HUD issued its One Strike Guide to PHAs.37 The guide encouraged the PHAs 
to utilize their authority to implement stringent screening practices and eviction 
procedures.38  
If the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Clinton’s passionate declaration, and HUD’s One 
Strike Guide were insufficient to convince PHAs to evict tenants and reject applicants 
based on perceived and past criminal behavior, HUD delivered the message by making 
PHAs’ funding contingent on their ability to screen and evict ex-offenders.39 Congress 
followed suit with the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA), 
which conditioned PHAs’ funding on the implementation of successful screening 
procedures and granted PHAs the discretion to determine what types of offenses could 
lead to exclusion and the length of time the exclusion would last.40 The QHWRA is 
perhaps most directly responsible for the wide variety of policies that exist today.41 
Additionally, the One Strike Guide permitted PHAs to implement their own exclusion 
criteria. This discretion created a multiple housing bans that vary broadly in regard to the 
types of crimes that trigger ineligibility.  
A practice among many PHAs is to reject applicants or evict tenants based solely 
on arrest records, even when their charges were dropped or consist of minor, non-violent 
offenses that are often correlated with poverty and are unrelated to applicants’ likelihood 
of being “good” tenants.42 Corinne Casey, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, 
describes one Black mother, P.C., who was denied housing because of one arrest four 
 
33 TURNER, supra note 18, at 5. 
34 See Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied Access to Public 
Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 551, 563 (2005) (suggesting that housing bans may be a consequence of 
the War on Drugs). 
35 Id. at 560. 
36 Id. at 560–61. 
37 Id. at 561. 
38 Id.  
39 See generally Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 
2518 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
40 See Carey, supra note 34, at 562.  
41 Janet Weiner, No-Trespass Policies in Public Housing 41 (Jan. 1, 2016) (unpublished Doctor of 
Philosophy Dissertation) (on file with Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations), 
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3876&context=edissertations.  
42 See Carey, supra note 34, at 566–67.  
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY   [2020 
 
 230
years prior to her application; the mother declared, “It’s done and over with, it’s in the 
past. I’m trying to do the right thing; I deserve a chance. Everyone deserves a chance.”43 
P.C. was never convicted of the offense that triggered the denial of her application for 
housing.44 
It is also common for individuals who have been arrested or convicted of 
disqualifying crimes to be ineligible for housing for periods of time much longer than the 
sentence attached to the underlying conviction.45 Finally, where proposed tenants have a 
criminal record, PHAs regularly neglect to perform case-by-case individualized reviews 
of applications, as HUD guidelines advise. Instead, PHAs often implement blanket 
denials for those with a criminal record.46 The characteristics of the bans demonstrate 
why “rehabilitated,” hardworking people who previously broke the law, and their family 
members, are almost categorically excluded from finding refuge from the disastrous 
housing market in public housing. These practices in the implementation of bans suggest 
that PHAs exclude more people than necessary to achieve their alleged government 
purpose.  
D. Family Separation as a Result of Public Housing Bans 
There are broad and severe consequences of these overreaching bans, namely 
family separation.47 Housing bans have the capacity to impact thousands of families. 
According to the National Center for Health in Public Housing, over two million people 
live in public housing, and children make up approximately 37% of public housing 
residents.48 The negative implications of family separation, a probable consequence of 
housing bans, cannot be overstated.  
Familial compositions impact the socio-emotional, academic, and physical 
development of children.49 For example, Robert Sampson and John Laub, criminologists 
awarded for their work on crime and the life course and crime and public policy, found 
that “family dysfunction50 . . . [can] increase the propensity of the individual’s life course 
toward criminal behavior.”51 Family dysfunction may appear in the form of abuse or 
negative characteristics, such as those stemming from the forced separation a housing ban 
 
43 Id. at 545. 
44 Id.  
45 See id. at 569. Exclusion periods differ between counties and cities, but the trend of excessive periods is 
consistent. A misdemeanor conviction for marijuana in New York City may lead to a five-year ban from 
PHAs, but a criminal sentence of probation for six months. Similarly, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a 
conviction for a violent felony can lead to lifetime ineligibility regardless of evidence of rehabilitation.    
46 See id. at 572. The failure to perform case-by-case reviews suggests that the policy infringing upon the 
constitutional rights of applicants may not be narrowly tailored.   
47 Id. at 584. In analyzing a substantive due process or equal protection challenge under strict scrutiny (as 
proposed), courts may be less convinced by allegedly compelling needs proffered by the government if 
courts understand (1) that PHA bans are often overly broad and (2) such bans have severe ramifications.  
48 Nat’l Ctr. for Health in Pub. Housing, Demographic Facts: Residents Living in Public Housing (May 31, 
2016), https://nchph.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Demographics-Fact-Sheet-2016-1.pdf.  
49 See Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. 
REV. 167, 170 (2015). See generally Lisa Strohschein et al., Family Structure Histories and High School 
Completion: Evidence from a Population-Based Registry, 34 CAN. J. SOC. 83, 83–103 (2009).   
50 Defined: John H. Laub et al., Assessing Sampson and Laub’s Life Course Theory of Crime, in 15 
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 313-33 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., 2006). 
51 Id.  
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may cause. Similarly, Robert Agnew’s “general strain theory” suggests that familial 
stress leads to feelings of loss or anger, which strains the expected conditions of 
relationships and pushes people to compensate for the strain by engaging in delinquency 
or crime.52  
The majority of these studies do not discuss the scenario of “intact” families, which 
for the purposes of this Note, are families who live separately because of public housing 
bans but otherwise function as one unit. Instead, studies primarily look solely at families 
separated due to divorce or incarceration. These families may face different hardships 
that alter the correlation between their composition and future delinquency or criminality. 
Nonetheless, the aforementioned studies are relevant because family stress is generally 
linked to subsequent discord and forced separation almost indefinitely results in family 
stress.53              
Literature surrounding “non-resident”54 parents also provides helpful insight into 
the consequences of housing bans because the cause of the familial separation is less 
pertinent than the mere fact and consequences of the separation itself.55 These studies 
often focus on “contact levels” between non-resident parents and their children,56 as 
scholars believe that the removal of a parent from a child’s life, rather than the physical 
separation alone, causes negative outcomes for the child.57 Generally, higher contact rates 
between non-resident parents and their children result in less familial stress.58 Contact 
rates between non-resident fathers and their children increase where fathers are employed 
and have high educational attainment and decrease when either parent begins 
cohabitating with a new partner.59 
Currently, no empirical studies focus on contact rates between non-resident parents 
and children who reside in a public housing complex where the non-resident parent is 
banned from visiting or residing. Thus, it is difficult to know whether educational 
attainment or employment status correlates with higher contact levels in these scenarios. 
If a similar trend does exist, however, it is particularly alarming as ex-felons often 
struggle to obtain meaningful employment.60   
More research is needed to determine the impact of housing bans on “intact” 
families. However, existing scholarship demonstrates that the separation forced by 
 
52 See Robert Agnew, Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency, 30 
CRIMINOLOGY 47, 49 (1992).  
53 John H. Laub et al., supra note 50.  
54 Non-resident parents refers to parents living separately from their children.  
55 This line of literature is similarly limited because it tends to focus on the inter-parental relationship and 
resident parents’ as “gatekeepers,” which is unlikely to be the case in intact families forced to be separated. 
See generally Daniel N. Hawkins et al., Parent-Adolescent Involvement: The Relative Influence of Parent 
Gender and Residence, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 125 (2006); Graeme B. Wilson, The Non-Resident 
Parental Role for Separated Fathers: A Review, 20 INT’L. J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 286 (2006).  
56 Note that the majority of studies on non-resident parents focus on fathers as non-resident parents since 
mothers are more likely to be the residential parent. This trend is not necessarily problematic because 
housing bans are more likely to impact men.  
57 See Wilson, supra note 55, at 287. 
58 Id.  
59 See id. at 290.  
60 See Patricia M. Harris & Kimberly S. Keller, Ex-Offenders Need Not Apply: The Criminal Background 
Check in Hiring Decisions, 21 J. CONTEM. CRIM. JUST. 6, 6 (2005) (“Most states have enacted various laws 
that make it difficult, if not impossible, for ex-offenders to acquire employment, regardless of their work 
history or risk of reoffending.”). 
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housing bans is likely to cause negative outcomes for both children and parents.61 Contact 
levels between non-resident parents and children will presumably be lower due to 
economic and educational predicaments compounded by the additional burden for non-
resident parents to join shared family activities when they cannot visit the residential 
family home.    
E. Limited Success of Constitutional Challenges to Public Housing Bans 
In light of the negative consequences of public housing bans, and the persistence of 
racist housing policies in the United States, is it unsurprising advocates and families have 
consistently challenged the bans’ constitutionality. The cases described in this subpart 
illustrate how courts have routinely rejected challenges brought under the First and 
Fourteenth amendments. To appreciate the rationale provided for these rejections, it is 
helpful to understand the legal framework lawyers must rely on in these claims.  
1. First Amendment: Right to Intimate Association 
The right to intimate association, derived from the First Amendment, is premised 
on the belief that the State cannot unjustifiably interfere with “highly personal 
relationships” because the decision to enter these relationships is central to the concept of 
individual liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.62 Step one, then, is determining whether 
a relationship is “intimate” for constitutional purposes.63 Once plaintiffs surpass this 
hurdle, they must demonstrate that the challenged state action amounts to “unwarranted 
state interference.”64 The Court is not particularly clear on the standard of review it 
applies to determine the permissibility of state interference on intimate associations. The 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roberts v. Jaycees provides insight the most insight. The 
Court indicates that the lower courts may provide “varying degrees of protection” to 
intimate associations, with family relationships receiving the most protection and 
business relationships receiving the least.65 
The Supreme Court has explicitly held that familial relationships, including 
cohabitation with relatives, fall within the right to intimate association.66 Thus, tenant-
 
61 See Ann Mooney et al., Impact of Family Breakdown on Children’s Well-being: Evidence Review, INST. 
OF EDUC., UNIV. OF LONDON 11 (2009) (noting that “the quality of parenting and of parent-child 
relationship often diminishes with separation. . .” and that “lone parenthood reduces the time and attention 
that is available for children[,]” increasing the likelihood that children suffer from behavioral problems).  
62 See Nancy Leong, The First Amendment and Fair Housing in the Platform Economy, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1001, 1012 (2017); see also Joshua P. Roling, Functional Intimate Association Analysis: A Doctrinal Shift 
to Save the Roberts Framework, 61 DUKE L.J. 903, 908 (2012).  
63 In determining whether relationships are “intimate,” courts consider the following factors, amongst 
others: size, purpose, selectivity, and seclusion from others. See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 
(1984). 
64 See id. at 619; see also Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 385 F.3d 935, 945 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing 
that while “[T]he freedom of intimate association is coextensive with the right of privacy; both the freedom 
of intimate association and the right of privacy describe that body of rights that protect[s] intimate human 
relationships from unwarranted intrusion or interference by the state.”).  
65 Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. 
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 278–279 n.55 (2006).  
66 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.  
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plaintiffs’ primarily hurdle in intimate relationship cases is convincing courts the state 
action is unwarranted. 
2. Fourteenth Amendment 
Tenants and their advocates have also challenged housing bans under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.67  
i. Due Process 
Procedural due process claims are analyzed according to a three-part test: (1) 
whether there is state or governmental action; (2) whether the state action affects private 
interests; and (3) whether there is a risk of erroneous deprivation of a private interest 
affected by the state action.68 The risk of erroneous deprivation is determined through an 
evaluation of procedural safeguards triggered before the deprivation occurs.69 Courts 
balance the interest of the government and the private individual to determine whether 
the procedural safeguards adopted are sufficient.70  
Substantive due process claims similarly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that a 
state or governmental action deprived the individual of a liberty interest.71 Then, once 
these prongs are satisfied, the government must produce a justification for the 
deprivation.72 Courts determine whether the proffered justification is sufficient through a 
“means-end” analysis.73 The level of scrutiny exercised in this means-end analysis 
depends on whether the government action deprived the individual of a fundamental 
right.74 Government action infringing upon fundamental rights or liberty interests are 
subjected to strict scrutiny, which requires the government to prove that the infringement 
is “necessary to further a compelling interest” and that it is narrowly tailored.75 If the 
government action does not infringe upon a fundamental right, rational basis review 
applies, and state action is generally upheld.76  
ii. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “No State shall 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”77 Laws often 
inherently draw distinctions among categories of people, so the issue in equal protection 
 
67 Infra pt. I(E)3. 
68 See James M. Klein & John E. Schrider Jr., Procedural Due Process and the Section 8 Leased Housing 
Program, 66 KY. L.J. 304, 344 (1977).  
69 See id.  
70 See id. at 331.  
71 See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625, 626 
(1992).  
72 See id. at 627.  
73 See id. at n.12 (“Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process used to evaluate the government’s 
justification for conduct that harms individuals. In applying means-end scrutiny, courts examine the 
purposes (ends) which government conduct is designed to serve and the methods (means) chosen to further 
those purposes.”).  
74 Id. at 627. Fundamental rights are enumerated in the Constitution or identified by the Supreme Court.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
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claims is not whether the statute treats all people in exactly the same way, but whether a 
particular classification is permissible.78  
Laws distinguishing on any basis other than race, national origin, or gender79 are 
traditionally subject to rational basis review.80 Courts overturn very few laws under 
rational basis review because the government is only required to provide “any 
conceivable rational basis” that justifies the legislation.81 As a result, laws distinguishing 
on the basis of race, and thus subject to strict scrutiny where the government is forced to 
articulate the law serves a “compelling government interest” and is “narrowly tailored” to 
minimize discrimination, are significantly more likely to be overturned.82 However, 
“facially neutral” laws that irrefutably disproportionately impact racial minorities, 
including housing bans, are not subject to this more searching review intended to protect 
vulnerable populations.83   
It is highly unlikely that public housing tenants will prevail on a disparate impact 
theory of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.84 To do so, plaintiff-
tenants have to demonstrate the PHA issuing the challenged public housing ban intended 
to discriminate on the basis of race.85 Evidence that public housing bans 
disproportionately impact Black and Latinx people, without a showing of such intent to 
discriminate, is insufficient.86 To be clear, however, public housing bans do 
disproportionally impact communities of color.  
First, racial disparities at every stage in the criminal justice system lead to a 
disproportionate percentage of minorities being imprisoned.87 Second, approximately 
sixty percent of households living in public housing are Black or Latinx.88 Thus, public 
 
78 See Ben Geiger, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1206 
(2006).  
79 Id. at 1207.  
80 Id. at 1206–08 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938); Williamson 
v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 435 (1955); and FCC v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 309 (1993)).     
81 Id. at 1207.  
82 Id. at 1206.  
83 See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding proof of discriminatory racial purpose 
is required in equal protection challenges based on a law’s disparate impact on a particular race, and 
consequently, placing an almost insurmountable burden on plaintiffs in an era where implicit bias is more 
commonplace than overt racism). 
84 Id.    
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 239.  
87 Julia A. Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison Gerrymandering and the Dilution of 
Prisoners’ Political Representation, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323, 334 (2018). 
88 I find it important to note that I am not intentionally continuing the pattern of disregarding the 
overrepresentation of Native Americans in the criminal justice system. See The Sentencing Project, Race & 
Justice News: Native Americans in the Justice System (Mar. 28, 2016), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/race-justice-news-native-americans-in-the-justice-system/. My 
decision to focus primarily on Black and Latinx families is due to the fact that Native Americans are less 
likely to be impacted by housing bans because they do not make up a significant percentage of public 
housing residents; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., Resident Characteristics Report (Dec. 2018), 
https://pic.hud.gov/pic/RCRPublic/rcrmain.asp.  
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housing bans on the basis of criminal arrests or convictions are more likely to impact 
families of color.89  
3. Strengthening Familial Protections in the Courtroom: A Summary of Relevant Cases 
Challenging Housing Bans  
Challenges to public housing evictions and bans on the basis of criminal 
convictions reached the Supreme Court in the early 2000s. In Department of Housing and 
Urban Development v. Rucker,90 four tenant-plaintiffs evicted under the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act alleged their evictions violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of 
association and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.91 The Court held that 
the tenants’ due process claim failed because the government was “acting as a landlord of 
property” as opposed to criminally punishing or civilly regulating “members of the 
general populace.”92 As a result, the tenant-plaintiffs failed to fulfill the “state action” 
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.93 
The Court similarly rejected the tenants’ freedom of association claim in a single 
sentence in a footnote reasoning that its decision in Lyng v. Automobile Workers94 
foreclosed the argument. In Lyng, the Court upheld the Food Stamp Act on the grounds 
that precluding household eligibility for food stamps where members were on strike does 
not unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to associate with their families because the 
Act does not prohibit families from dining together or otherwise “directly and 
substantially” interfere with family living arrangements.95 Since the Court did not 
actually analyze Lyng’s applicability to Rucker, Judge Sneed’s application in his 
dissenting opinion from the 9th Circuit is the most informative.96 Judge Sneed reasons 
that the associational rights of the family members deprived of food stamps because one 
member was on strike in Lyng, like the tenants barred from public housing because one 
member’s arrest or conviction in Rucker, are “implicated” but not in “significant danger” 
because of the withdrawal of the government benefit.97 Further, the Court is deferential to 
the congressional view of “what constitutes wise economic or social policy.”98  
One year after Rucker, in Virginia v. Hicks, a barred individual brought suit against 
a Richmond public housing development’s ban policy under the First Amendment after 
being convicted of trespass for trying to return to the development.99 On the day that the 
 
89 This disparity is evidenced by the fact that “a black child born today is less likely to be raised by both 
parents than a black child during slavery.” MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 224 (2012).    
90 535 U.S. 125 (2002).   
91 Id. at 128, 136 n.6. 
92 Id. at 135.   
93 See Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State 
Action” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 222 (1976). 
94 485 U.S. 360 (1988). 
95 Id. at 365. Dismissal of the freedom of the association claims on these grounds illustrates the ambiguity 
within the second prong of First Amendment intimate association claims briefly mentioned.  
96 Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001).   
97 Id. at 1139.  
98 Id.   
99 See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 115 (2003). The overbreadth doctrine invalidates enforcement of a 
law that “punishes a substantial amount of protected free speech, in relation to statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep” unless a limiting construction narrows the law. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).  
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY   [2020 
 
 236
plaintiff, Hicks, was issued a summons for trespass, he informed the officer he was only 
there to bring pampers for his baby.100 Hicks’s mother lived on the premises, and he had 
asked the housing development’s manager, Mrs. Rogers, for permission to return on two 
separate occasions to no avail.101 Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority 
(RRHA) enacted a trespassing policy that authorized Richmond police officers to serve 
persons on RRHA premises without “a legitimate business or social purpose” with notice 
barring such persons from the premises and to arrest those who returned or refused to 
leave.102 The Virginia Supreme Court held the RRHA policy was unconstitutionally 
overbroad because the policy vested too much discretion in the individual housing 
development’s manager.103 The concern over discretion resulted from an “unwritten rule” 
where the manager would grant nonresidents permission to hand out flyers on the 
sidewalks of the development.104 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RHHA’s 
policy was not facially invalid because there was no evidence that the policy 
“prohibit[ed] a substantial amount of protected speech.”105   
Despite these unsuccessful claims, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
challenged the Housing Authority of the City of Annapolis (HACA)’s policy of banning 
individuals “who have been involved in or conduct criminal activity on or near public 
housing”106 from being on HACA property on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds 
in 2009.107 The ACLU responded to the government-as-private-landlord safeguard 
discussed in Rucker by naming the city of Annapolis and Annapolis Police Department as 
defendants.108 If the case had not settled, it would have proceeded on the theory that the 
policy could only be upheld if it survived strict scrutiny. To prevail, the government 
would have needed to demonstrate that the ban was narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest because the City’s policy deprived tenants of their fundamental 
right to freedom of association and suspended their First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights in the realm of public housing.109 Going forward, subjecting the housing policies to 
strict scrutiny could drastically change the jurisprudence surrounding public housing 
bans.  
Rucker, Hicks, and City of Annapolis do not require the total abandonment of First 
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to housing bans. However, the intimate 
association doctrine remains undeveloped and, as a result, lawsuits on this ground are 
inherently vulnerable.110 Further, in equal protection claims, tenant-plaintiffs’ only hope 
of receiving heightened scrutiny rests on successfully arguing that ex-felons are a 
“discrete and insular minority” or introducing evidence of discriminatory intent in a 
 
100 Hicks v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2000).  
101 Id. 
102 Hicks, 539 U.S. at 124.  
103 Id. at 115, 118.  
104 Id. at 121.  
105 Id. at 124.  
106 See Weiner, supra note 41, at 179. (citing Annapolis Trespass Policy).  
107 See Sharps v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Annapolis, Civil Case No. 02C09143799 (2009).  
108 Weiner, supra note 41, at 53.  
109 Id.  
110 See Marcus, supra note 65, at 283 (“[T]wentieth century Supreme Court decisions that mentioned 
intimate association only minimally addressed intimate association in terms of what it is not, without 
providing meaningful guidance on what it is.”).  
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disparate impact theory of discrimination on the basis of race. While there is merit to both 
of these arguments, the likelihood that either one prevails in the housing context is far 
from guaranteed.111 For these reasons, advocates should begin exploring less traditional 
approaches to challenging public housing bans.  
The remainder of this Note suggests that the Court’s decision Obergefell v. Hodges, 
a case involving a right to marriage, may serve as a steppingstone to achieving a 
constitutional right to family life that would then offer a novel angle from which to 
approach a constitutional challenge to public housing bans.  
II. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RIGHT TO FAMILY SANCTITY  
Part II sets forth a pathway to securing broader constitutional protections for 
families affected by public housing bans. A significant portion of Part II focuses on 
Obergefell,112 the landmark marriage equality case because it creates holes that advocates 
should exploit to push us closer to protecting all families regardless of marital status. To 
the extent the discussion focuses on marital families, it is because the pathway proposed 
requires advocates to: (1) secure protections for marital families and then (2) utilize the 
equal protection clause to expand the newly developed protections to cover all families, 
regardless of marital status.  
Obergefell established a constitutional right to marriage without clarifying the 
scope of that right.113 Parties have begun to utilize the resulting ambiguity to challenge 
government actions that interfere with marital unions.114 Consequently, cases that turn on 
how broadly or narrowly the right to marriage is interpreted will likely become more 
frequent. Families injured by public housing bans are in a great position to urge courts to 
rule that the right to marriage includes the right to live with one’s spouse. If courts adopt 
this broader interpretation of the right to marriage, then PHA bans would be subject to 
more stringent review.  
A brief review of Supreme Court cases regarding government action touching 
families provides support for a broad interpretation in the realm of family living 
arrangements. 
A. Seeds to a Future Right to Family Sanctity: Precedential Cases 
The right to family life in the United States, whatever it encompasses, is a liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.115 The 
following subparts illustrate how the rights to family life and privacy in America have 
 
111 Zach Newman, Hands Up, Don’t Shoot: Policing, Fatal Force, and Equal Protection in the Age of 
Colorblindness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117, 139 (2015) (“Even when the laws have disparate impacts, 
facially neutral laws receive strict scrutiny only where there is a proven discriminatory intent.”); see 
Geiger, supra note 78, at 1992 (suggesting ex-offenders’ responsibility for their membership in the 
classification and moral culpability serves as a “major doctrinal obstacle” to treatment as a suspect class).  
112 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015). 
113 See generally Kerry v. Din, 575 U.S. 86 (2015). 
114 Id. See also Yafai v. Pompeo, 924 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2019) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that a 
citizen’s “liberty interest in bringing [one’s] wife to America” cannot be deprived without a detailed 
explanation of the grounds for inadmissibility.) 
115 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
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evolved. Notably, the Supreme Court recognized a number of parental rights116 prior to 
the expansion of privacy rights more generally after its landmark decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.117  
1. Development of Parental Rights 
The evolution of a parental liberty to control the education of one’s children as a 
liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment began in 1923 in Meyer v. 
Nebraska.118 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held unconstitutional a state statute 
prohibiting persons from teaching any foreign languages to children who have not 
successfully passed the eighth grade.119 The Court explained that legislative action 
interfering with a recognized liberty interest, including the right of parents to give their 
children the education “suitable to their station in life,”120 may only be upheld if it is 
“reasonably relat[ed] to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”121 
After clarifying the standard, the Court conceded that the proffered purpose of the statute, 
fostering a homogeneous community with American ideals,122 was permissible. However, 
the Court held the statute was unconstitutional because the “means adopted . . . exceed 
the limitations upon the power of the State.”123 Thus, it appears the Court applied a 
proportionality-based inquiry despite purporting to determine the statute’s 
constitutionality based on a mere relation to a permissible purpose.  
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,124 parental 
liberty was reinterpreted as encompassing a general right of parents to direct the 
upbringing, including their education decisions, of children under their care.125 Similarly 
to its reasoning in Meyer, the Court recited a “reasonable relation to some purpose within 
the competency of the State”126 as the test deployed to determine the constitutionality of 
the Oregon law127 that effectively criminalized parents for not sending their children to 
public school. The holding, however, may be better understood as a categorical 
prohibition against “standardizing children” by precluding them from attending private 
institutions.128 
The scope of parental liberty interests outside of the context of education was first 
raised in Prince v. Massachusetts in 1944.129 Mrs. Prince, accused and convicted of 
 
116 I characterize parental and marital protections as a type of broader “familial right” for the purposes of 
this paper. 
117 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
118 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
119 See id. at 402.   
120 Id. at 400.  
121 Id. 
122 See id. at 402.   
123 Id.  
124 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
125 See id. at 534-35.   
126 Id. at 535. 
127 Id.  
128 See id.; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-507 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923), and holding that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional because the state lacks general power to 
standardize children).  
129 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944).  
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violating state child labor laws,130 challenged the constitutionality of the statutes on the 
grounds that they infringed on her First Amendment right to freedom of religion and her 
Fourteenth Amendment parental right.131 Notably, the majority opinion completely 
omitted the “reasonable relation” language and instead noted the “state has a wide range 
of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s 
welfare.”132 The Court’s inconsistent language affords government actors less or more 
discretion over children, depending on the circumstances. While such an approach is 
reasonable, its indirect application makes it difficult to determine how future cases will 
be reviewed.   
2. Right to Privacy 
After the notion of parental rights was developed throughout the early-to-mid 
1900s, the Supreme Court continued to use the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to limit state action in spaces and relationships that had been traditionally 
understood as private, including the marital relationship. Griswold v. Connecticut,133 best 
known as establishing a fundamental right to privacy,134 simultaneously established the 
specific right to marital privacy. Justice Frankfurter used the Court’s holdings in Meyer 
and Pierce135 to bolster his theory that attached to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are 
“penumbral rights” which create zones of privacy.136 On this line of reasoning, the Court 
struck down the Connecticut statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives as 
unconstitutional on the grounds that the regulation swept “unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby invade[d] the area of protected freedoms” understood as privacy in the marriage 
relationship.137 
3. Family Life 
In 1974, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a New York village 
ordinance limiting one-family dwellings to “traditional families” or to groups of two 
unrelated persons in the Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.138 The ordinance defined family 
as “one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage.”139 The Court held the 
 
130 Id.; Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 149 §§ 80-81 (2019) (enforcing provisions of Massachusetts’ child labor law 
prohibiting boys and girls under 12 from selling newspapers).   
131 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 164.  
132 Id. at 167.  
133 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
134 See generally David Helscher, Griswold v. Connecticut and the Unenumerated Right to Privacy, 15 N. 
ILL. U.L. REV. 33 (1994). 
135 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & 
Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  
136 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83 (“The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor 
is the Bill of Rights. The Right to Educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice – whether private or 
parochial—is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or foreign language. Yet 
the First Amendment has been construed to include certain of those rights... without those peripheral rights 
the specific rights would be less secure. And so we affirm the principle of the Pierce and Mayer case.”). 
137 Id. at 485.  
138 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). Note that ordinances are considered “economic 
and social legislation” which are upheld as long as the legislation is “reasonable, not arbitrary,” and bears a 
“rational relationship to a permissible state objective.”  
139 Id. at 2. 
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ordinance to be constitutional because it did not ban forms of association because it 
permitted residents to entertain whomever they liked.140 In contrast, three years later, in 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio,141 the Court overturned East Cleveland’s zoning 
ordinance. The Court reasoned that limiting occupancy of dwellings to members of a 
single family violated due process where family was defined in a manner that “intrudes 
on choices concerning family living arrangements.”142 In Moore, a grandmother was 
convicted of violating the ordinance because she lived with her son and two grandsons—
who were first cousins rather than siblings.143 The majority reasoned the “strong 
constitutional protection of the sanctity of the family established in numerous decisions 
of th[e] Court extends to the family choice involved in th[e] case and is not confined 
within an arbitrary boundary drawn at the limits of the nuclear family.”144 In short, 
because the ordinance intruded upon choices concerning one’s family life, the usual 
judicial deference afforded to legislatures was replaced with a more searching inquiry 
into the importance of the governmental interests served and the extent to which the 
regulation served these interests.145 The Court’s reasoning in Moore seems 
straightforward in light of the cases previously discussed. The Court was more concerned 
with governmental interference with personal decisions regarding one’s marital or family 
choices.146  
B. Right to Marriage 
Despite recognizing the right to marital privacy in 1965147 and the importance of 
the marital union in American society long before that,148 the Court did not recognize a 
fundamental right to marry until 2015 in Obergefell v. Hodges.149 The Court offered four 
principles to support its holding: (1) that the concept of individual autonomy 
encompasses the right to make personal choices concerning marriage; (2) that the right of 
intimate association accompanying marriage must be afforded to both same-sex couples 
and opposite-sex couples; (3) that the right to marriage protects children and families 
already afforded constitutional protection in private matters; and (4) that marriage should 
be understood as the “keystone of the Nation’s social order.”150  
While Obergefell is widely celebrated by many for recognizing discrimination on 
the basis of sexual-orientation is contrary to American values, the decision complicates 
 
140 See id. at 17.  
141 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).  
142 Id. at 499. 
143 Id. at 496–97.  
144 Id. at 494.  
145 See id. at 499.  
146 Id. at 498–99 (“distinguishing the ordinance in Belle Terre from that in Moore because the former 
“expressly allowed all who were related by “blood, adoption, or marriage to live together” while the latter 
“has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply into the family itself.” The Court’s 
lack of judicial review and general approach to protecting the “sanctity of the family” has been far less 
stable and more problematic in cases concerning public housing policies banning ex-felons and similar 
classes of people).  
147 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
148 See generally Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1988); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).   
149 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).   
150 See id. at 2589-2590.  
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the jurisprudence surrounding familial rights.151 Many components of family life are still 
left unprotected from state interference under the Court’s approach to the fundamental 
right to marriage in Obergefell, despite the recognition of a right to marital privacy and 
right to parental liberty decades earlier.  
Although there is a general consensus that Obergefell established a fundamental 
right to marriage, some scholars argue otherwise.152 The success of the argument that 
Obergefell provides additional constitutional safeguards from government interference in 
familial spaces turns on this point of tension. As such, this Note first demonstrates that 
Obergefell does in fact establish a constitutional right to marriage under the Substantive 
Due Process Clause (SDP).153 Afterwards, this Note addresses the question of how the 
right to marriage should be interpreted.   
1. Substantive Due Process & The Right to Marriage 
While there is significant jurisprudential uncertainty around the SDP broadly, the 
fundamental right to marriage articulated in Obergefell remains good law. The concept of 
substantive due process exists because the Supreme Court reasoned that the word 
“liberty” in the due process clause is not “define[d] with exactness.”154 As a result, the 
Court must determine what individual “rights” are “liberty interests” that trigger 
heightened constitutional protection.155 Challenges to Obergefell’s legitimacy may be 
more attributable to the conflicting state of our substantive due process jurisprudence, 
outlined below, than the highly political debate over marriage equality itself. The conflict 
exists, in part, because the Court has relied upon conflicting theories to identify 
substantive due process rights.156 
The most restrictive theory only extends constitutional protection to “liberties that 
are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”157 Justices ascribing to the 
“deeply rooted” theory of substantive due process normally require a “‘careful 
 
151  See generally Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584. 
152  See Ilya Somin, A Great Decision on Same-Sex Marriage—But Based on Dubious Reasoning, WASH. 
POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/26/a-great-
decision-on-same-sex-marriage-but-based-on-dubious-reasoning/?utm_term=.60c28dfb88e2 (critiquing 
Justice Kennedy’s legal analysis for failure to “clearly conclude that either the Due Process Clause or the 
Equal Protection Clause by itself creates a right to same-sex marriage” because “if a sufficient important 
right (Due Process Clause) is denied for discriminatory reasons (Equal Protection), then the Fourteenth 
Amendment has been violated. However, both the criteria for what makes the right important enough and 
the criteria for proving discrimination seem extremely vague.”). 
153 Loving v. Virginia held that classifications on the grounds of race or sexual orientation in marital statutes 
are unconstitutional. 388 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1967).  Since Loving addressed discriminatory classifications, it is 
most appropriately characterized as an equal protection case. Obergefell is distinguishable from Loving 
because Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, relied heavily on the due process clause. Id.  By 
interpreting the right to marriage as a fundamental liberty interest protected under the due process clause, 
Justice Kennedy ensured any governmental action infringing on the right to marriage would be subjected to 
heightened judicial protection. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 
1502 (1999) (“Substantive means the government must show a compelling reason that would demonstrate 
an adequate justification for [interfering with a fundamental liberty interest].”).  
154 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
155 See Conkle, supra note 7, at 66.  
156 See generally id. 
157 Id. at 66 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)).  
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY   [2020 
 
 242
description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”158 A second theory, referred to 
as the theory of “reasoned judgement,” permits the Court to evaluate the liberty interest 
in question and weigh it against competing governmental concerns to determine whether 
the substantive due process clause is implicated.159 This theory is most explicitly applied 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,160 where the Court 
reaffirmed women’s right to abortion on the basis of “reasoned judgement” in addition to 
the principle of precedent.161 A third and final theory was introduced in Lawrence v. 
Texas,162 which overturned Bowers v. Hardwick163 on the grounds that consenting adults 
have a liberty interest in sexual relations. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in 
Lawrence, reasoned that evolving national values, rather than history alone, are relevant 
in identifying liberty interests because the Framers “[k]new times can blind us to certain 
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact 
serve only to oppress.”164  
While the stability of substantive due process jurisprudence generally may be 
unstable because of conflicting approaches, surely Justice Kennedy’s reliance on 
substantive due process in Obergefell is not meritless. In other words, Obergefell is no 
more likely to be overturned than other controversial substantive due process cases.165 
Though the validity of the substantive due process doctrine is beyond the scope of this 
Note, the relevant takeaway for present purposes is that the fundamental right to marriage 
articulated in Obergefell remains good law. The pivotal question is whether the right to 
marriage may be extended to preserve family unity. 
C. Getting to a Shared Household 
The right to marriage should be interpreted broadly. Justice Douglas addressed the 
problems inherent in adopting a formalistic approach to protecting constitutional rights in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.166 Justice Douglas reasoned that “without . . . those peripheral 
rights the specific rights would be less secure.”167 As a result, the principle of penumbras 
was born.168 The principle protects rights by preventing unduly narrow interpretations 
from “deny[ing] force and often meaning” of the rights.169 Under the principle of 
 
158 Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 154 (2015). 
159 See Conkle, supra note 7, at 63.  
160 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
161 Conkle, supra note 7, at 67.  
162 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
163 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute criminalizing consensual sodomy).  
164 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.  
165 The ongoing debate over the constitutionally of abortion after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and 
the Court’s holding in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), demonstrate this reality. 
166 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
167 Id. at 482–83.  
168 Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PENN L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1992) 
(quoting Justice Douglas in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83: “The association of people is not mentioned in 
the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice—
whether public or private or parochial—is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular 
subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to include certain of those 
rights.”).  
169 Id. at 1344.  
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penumbras, state regulation cannot arbitrarily encroach upon a specific right and 
emancipations that “help give [that right] life and substance.”170  
Applying the controversial principle of penumbras in the unsettled substantive due 
process context is complex because the doctrine varies greatly from the Bill of Rights, 
but the need to ensure rights are given their full force and meaning exists whether the 
right is enumerated or unenumerated.171 The weaknesses within the substantive due 
process doctrine should not justify departure from principled constitutional norms. The 
right to get married serves little purpose if the government is then free to interfere with 
critical areas of the marital union, such as cohabitation.  
Kerry v. Din provides helpful insight into whether the Supreme Court may be 
receptive to interpreting the right to marriage as encompassing interconnected interests, 
like cohabitation.172 In Din, an American citizen reasoned the government’s denial of her 
husband’s visa application deprived her of her constitutional right to live with her 
spouse.173 The dissent, signed on by four Justices, reasoned that the “institution of 
marriage, which encompasses the right of spouses to live together” is the kind of 
constitutional interest afforded procedural protections under the due process clause.174 
The plurality assumed that Din had a protected liberty interest for the purposes of the 
case, which was decided according to immigration principles.175 Since normal 
constitutional norms are not applied in immigration, the most important takeaway from 
Din is that at least four, and possibly six, Justices believe the right to marriage 
encompasses ancillary rights, one of which could be cohabitation.176 
D. Leveraging the Penumbras Principle to Combat Public Housing Bans  
Applying the penumbras principle to public housing bans impacting married 
persons requires: (1) identifying which right(s) are peripheral to the right to marriage; and 
(2) determining whether a public housing policy sweeps unnecessarily broadly and 
invades an area of protected freedoms.177 
Justice Kennedy’s summary of the principles and traditions that demonstrate 
marriage is a “fundamental” right under the Constitution similarly support the notion that 
living in the same household as one’s spouse should be understood as peripheral to the 
right to marry. Particularly relevant are: (1) the principle in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence that marriage is a “two-person union unlike any other in its importance to 
the committed individuals” and (2) the tradition of using marriage as a means of 
safeguarding children and families.178 On this point, Kennedy reasons that marriage 
offers stability and predictability that protects children raised by married parents from an 
 
170 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85. 
171 Id.   
172 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). 
173 See id. at 2131, 2133. 
174 Id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (comparing procedural due process to substantive due process).  
175 See id. at 2128.  
176 See generally Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (and note that Justice Kennedy and Alito concurred in the 
judgment while Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Breyer’s dissent).  
177 See generally NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).  
178 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015).  
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“uncertain family life.”179 This language reflects society’s understanding of marriage as a 
proxy for a two-parent shared household.180 
As a result, the constitutionality of public housing policies that infringe upon the 
right of married persons to cohabitate—a fundamental right—turns on whether the policy 
is “necessary to further a compelling interest” and narrowly tailored to this goal.181 As 
discussed, the “compelling interest” requirement is a more stringent standard than the 
“legitimate government interest” standard courts have consistently held housing bans 
satisfy.182 However, it seems unlikely that courts will hold PHAs’ interest in decreasing 
drugs and crimes in complexes known for being dangerous as not “compelling.” The 
constitutionality of the public housing bans, then, will likely turn on the scope of a 
particular ban under this framework. Policies sweeping unnecessarily broadly, like those 
banning applicants due to arrests not resulting in convictions or those that impose unduly 
long lengths of time for when bans apply, would presumably be unable to pass 
constitutional muster in the proposed approach. 
III. ASPIRATIONS FOR THE FUTURE: A RIGHT TO FAMILY SANCTITY UNCONNECTED TO 
MARRIAGE 
The proposed pathway to subjecting public housing bans to heightened scrutiny by 
expanding the penumbra’s principle to encompass fundamental liberty interests is only 
the first step in the right direction—not the finish line. The goal is a fundamental right to 
family sanctity detached from marital status. It is clear that Obergefell does not get us 
here, but it may get us closer. 
Importantly, Justice Kennedy’s view of marriage as “reflecting the ideals of family 
and central to social order,”183 implicitly endorses society’s problematic tendency of 
ostracizing non-marital families.184 Since marriage rates are declining, the practical effect 
of expanding constitutional protections for marital unions will be minimal.185 This is 
 
179 Id. at 2590. Of course, this language is also problematic in that it perpetuates the stereotype that two-
parent households led by unmarried parents and single-parent households are inherently less stable. As 
discussed in Part III, however, this stereotypical evidence can strengthen the equal protection claim 
nonmarital families launch in response to differential treatment on the basis of marital status.  
180 See David C. Ribar, Why Marriage Matters for Child Wellbeing, 25 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 11, 11 
(2015) (“Marriage between two parents, compared to other living arrangements. . .”) (emphasis added). 
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especially true in public housing, where marital rates are likely substantially lower.186 
This reality illustrates the limitations inherent in placing marriage at the core of the right 
to family sanctity. 
However, in the United States, expanding individual rights is often achieved 
through an “incremental process.”187 So, while acknowledging Obergefell’s flaws we 
must also recognize its flaws may be the very reason nonmarital families have greater 
constitutional protection in the future. 
Griswold and Eisenstadt illustrate this phenomenon well. In 1965, in Griswold, the 
Court held that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally 
intruded upon the “right of marital privacy.”188 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt, the Court 
reasoned that a Massachusetts statute permitting married persons to obtain contraceptives 
while prohibiting single persons to do the same violated the equal protection clause.189  
Currently, Obergefell has the potential to be the Griswold that leads to the “new” 
Eisenstadt.  
My hope is that advocates recognize the power in potential, even where it manifests 
in an unorthodox manner, and capitalize upon potential as the battle for the right to 
family sanctity continues. After all, the tools are limited, and the stakes are high. 
 
186 Id. at 81 (“For less-educated, lower-income couples. . . commitment and, hence, marriage has less value 
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approval for individual rights grows out of “deliberate, strategic organizing by rights advocates.”) 
188 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
189 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). 
